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ABSTRACT
Studies on foreign policy think tanks have too often remained 
disconnected from the analysis of foreign policy outcomes. Yet, 
investigating the development, functions and influence of think tanks 
can provide valuable insights into the context in which foreign policy 
is formulated. The Czech Republic and Poland represent interesting 
comparative cases in this regard: while Polish think tanks are more 
numerous and tend to be better placed in international rankings, 
they are less involved in the policymaking process than their Czech 
counterparts. This contrast has mainly to do with the sociology of 
foreign policy elites and the role of political parties in both countries.
Although they have not yet acquired the stature of their American counterparts, foreign 
policy think tanks have proliferated in European Union (EU) member states. The scholarly 
analysis of this phenomenon has tended to focus mainly on the think tank scenes of some 
of the big Western European member states, however, and not sufficiently on that of the 
ten Central European countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2007. In addition, 
studies on European foreign policy think tanks have often remained disconnected from the 
study of foreign policy outcomes. Central Europe, for its historical specificities and internal 
contrasts, constitutes a rich and didactic terrain for reflecting on thinks tanks as factors 
and actors in policymaking.
Central European countries’ recent diplomatic history created a structural demand for 
the products of think tanks. After having seen, as satellites of the Soviet Union, their foreign 
policies largely determined from the outside, they had to establish the basis and main ori-
entations of their new foreign policies in the early 1990s, in radically transformed regional 
and domestic environments. Later on, in preparation for their accession to the EU and 
then as member states and parties to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), they 
had to adapt to a complex political system and define positions on a range of international 
issues that had remained outside their foreign policy remit. In both contexts, the need for 
innovative solutions to novel and complex issues fuelled the constant demand for policy 
analysis and recommendations.
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What is more, one could also expect think tanks to have an actual impact in respond-
ing to this demand or, at least, for the governments of these countries to be positively 
inclined towards these kind of organisations. In the cases of Poland and, especially, the 
Czech Republic, as medium-sized states, the decision-making chain is not too extensive 
and foreign policy think tanks not too numerous; thus meaningful interaction should, in 
principle, be possible.1 In addition, in these countries, dissidents coming from civil society 
played a meaningful role in bringing down the communist regime and several of them 
became part of the political elite; thus they could be expected, in theory, to be rather open 
to societal groups feeding into the policy process.2
In spite of these similar historical and political configurations, as our study shows, think 
tanks seem more involved in foreign policymaking in the Czech Republic than in Poland. 
By reflecting on these two cases, both individually and comparatively, this article purports 
to shed light on the development, roles and influences of foreign policy think tanks. It does 
so with a view to contributing not just to think tank studies but also, more broadly, to a 
better understanding of the foreign policymaking context in these two countries. What 
factors affected the development of Czech and Polish think tanks? What functions do think 
tanks perform, if any, in terms of policy innovation, development and implementation? To 
what extent do they actually influence the policy process? How can the differences between 
the Czech and Polish cases be explained, particularly in terms of actual involvement and 
influence of think tanks?
In answering these questions, the article proceeds in three steps. It starts by briefly setting 
forth a framework for approaching think tanks and integrating them in the analysis of policy. 
Then, it considers the Czech and Polish cases in turn and seeks to answer, for each, the first 
three sets of questions presented above. Finally, it draws conclusions from the comparative 
exercise and tries to explain why foreign policy think tanks are more involved in the policy 
process in the Czech Republic than in Poland. In doing so, it places the emphasis on the 
sociology of foreign policy elites and invites future research on think tanks to pay greater 
attention to this variable.
Think tanks and foreign policymaking: a framework for analysis
Think tanks remain largely unidentified – and often ignored– subjects in the analysis of 
foreign policy. They are occasionally criticised in the media as being eminences grises or the 
focus of self-referential studies, but rarely investigated as factors in themselves. In many 
ways, the difficulty in integrating think tanks in analysis stems from their blurred agency, 
whether in the sense of their contours as actors or the discernibility of their activities.
In the most basic sense, think tanks can be defined as organisations that have “policy 
research functions and policy advisory practices”.3 They vary enormously, though, in their 
size, endowment, staffing, source of funding, strategies and productions. The most effective 
way to differentiate and classify them remains, in our view, reference to the latter charac-
teristic. Thus, McGann and Weaver’s typology discerning between academic, contract and 
advocacy think tanks will be applied in the following.4 “Academic think tanks” (or “research 
1according to Krastev, in central europe, “think tank influence on government depends primarily on the personal access that 
analysts have to cabinet members or the prime Minister” (Krastev, “The liberal estate”, 10).
2See, for instance, Szulecki, “heretical geopolitics of central europe”, 25-36.
3Stone, “Think tanks, policy advice and governance”, 4.
4McGann and Weaver, “Introduction”, 1-35.
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centres”) produce methodologically rigorous, often scientific, analysis; their researchers 
tend to have PhDs and publish in scholarly outlets in parallel to their think tank activities. 
“Contract think tanks” have less of a scholarly focus, their productions are often directed 
at public administrations, in the form of analyses but also sometimes of training. While 
research centres tend to define their priorities and focus internally, the priorities and focus of 
contract think tanks are often set by their funders or in relation to specific projects. Finally, 
“advocacy think tanks” focus on advancing a particular idea, position or agenda. Their aim 
is often more to persuade than to inform.
In studying think tanks, the literature has pursued three main lines of enquiry. A first 
body of works has explored the conditions and modalities of the development of think tanks 
in national contexts. It has usually done so by providing historical and empirical accounts 
of some of the most prominent and well known think tanks.5 By studying think tanks’ 
imbrications in national political cultures and institutional architectures, these studies shed 
light on the structural elements that favour think tank emergence and, one can assume, 
think tank activity and impact. For instance, as explained by Donald Abelson, the success 
and flourishing of think tanks in the US context can be attributed to a “fragmented and 
decentralized political system offering multiple channels of access to policy-makers”, “weak 
political parties”, a “political and social culture that encourages philanthropy and policy 
entrepreneurship”, and a high “turnover in the senior ranks of the civil service” which “facil-
itates the movement of think-tank scholars in and out of government agencies” (movement 
itself made possible by these agencies’ openness towards non-career civil servants).6 These 
elements – institutional system, strength of political parties, political culture, and dynamics 
prevailing in the civil service – will be retained as benchmarks when evaluating whether 
the Czech and Polish contexts provide fertile ground for think tanks.
A second strand in the literature focuses on the actual or possible functions, roles and 
strategies of think tanks in the overall political process and in foreign policy in particular.7 
Some of these studies examine, for instance, whether think tanks can play a role in bridging 
the policy-academia gap,8 while others debate whether they should be seen as transmis-
sion belts for civil society inputs or, rather, outposts serving a dominant ideology and set 
of interests.9 Some of them tend to adopt a prescriptive or normative angle, however, or 
in any case do not seek to provide generalizable analytical tools. As will be emphasized 
below, through their indirect practices and direct demands, governments play a key role in 
mediating think tank activity. Thus, because it puts the emphasis on non-state actors’ inter-
actions and synergies with governmental agencies, the framework developed by Andrew 
Cooper and Brian Hocking appears particularly useful. They distinguish between situa-
tions in which non-state actors (in our case think tanks) act as “kick-starters” (engaging 
in proactive behaviour and framing the government agenda), “agents” (taking a facilitative 
and sometimes subcontracted role that supports the activities of the government) or “joint 
managers” (working with governmental agencies in a cooperative venture where know-how 
is shared and some kind of division of labour established).10
5See, for instance, parmar, “anglo-american elites in the Interwar Years”, 53-75.
6abelson, “old World, new World”, 131.
7Stone, “Garbage cans or Think Tanks?”; Selee, What Should Think Tanks Do?; parmar, “Institutes of International affairs ”.
8Jentleson and ratner, “Bridging the Beltway–Ivory Tower Gap”; Walt, “relationship Between Theory and policy”.
9Medvetz, Think Tanks in America; parmar, Think Tanks and Power.
10cooper and hocking, “Governments, non-governmental organisations”, 370–4.
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The third line of enquiry – both the most promising and the most intricate – involves 
investigating the influence and impact of think tanks on foreign policy outcomes.11 
Concluding a recent and comprehensive reflection on the role of think tanks in interna-
tional affairs, Donald Abelson calls on political scientists to “think more critically about 
how to evaluate the contribution these organizations make to policy development”, while 
he acknowledges that “isolating the impact that think-tanks have had at different stages of 
the policy cycle remains a formidable undertaking”.12 Think tanks can mainly influence the 
policy process as idea entrepreneurs, and since it is difficult to trace the origins and impact 
of ideas, it is indeed difficult to trace the influence of think tanks. In addition, think tanks 
can hardly be treated as unitary actors: they are platforms, composed of many individuals 
who have multiple affiliations and multiple ideas, which makes attribution difficult.
Nevertheless, we argue that the literature on policy analysis does provide a venue for 
integrating think tanks into the analysis. For instance, the concept of epistemic commu-
nity coined by Peter Haas makes it possible to study the texture of think tank-govern-
ment relations by treating them in a specific, common environment. He defines epistemic 
communities as “networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in 
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area”.13 Similarly, in conceptualising policymaking as the confrontation of 
and eventual compromise between various belief systems, the advocacy coalition frame-
work allows one to grasp how certain groups emerge in these communities and how they 
promote a particular preference within the policy system.14 Overall, think tanks can have 
more impact on the policy process when they participate in or even contribute to shaping 
the strategies of specific advocacy coalitions acting from inside the foreign policy elite.
This analytical framework is applied to two Central European countries, Poland and the 
Czech Republic. The think tank scene in Central and Eastern Europe has received some 
attention from the scholarly literature, especially in the context of the post-communist 
political and economic transition of the 1990s. Several studies have documented in a rich 
and insightful manner the emergence of policy research institutes in these specific condi-
tions as well as the functions they have performed (pursuing, in other words, the first and 
second research tracks identified above).15 There remains, however, a gap in this literature 
with respect to the influence of foreign policy think tanks. On the one hand, many of the 
studies on Central and Eastern European think tanks have adopted a descriptive approach, 
presenting a regional think tank scene that had remained understudied, but rarely unpacking 
its impact on policy outcomes in a systematic manner. As emphasized by Ivan Krastev, “It is 
researchers of institutes and not researchers of the policy process who prevail in the study 
of the Central and East European think tank”.16 On the other hand, the works that have 
engaged in investigating think tanks’ influence on legislative decisions and policy debates, 
as have Krastev’s, have rarely focused on foreign policy as such, looking instead at liberal 
reforms in the domestic sphere. This article contributes to addressing this gap by focusing 
11higgott and Stone, “The limits of Influence”.
12abelson, “old World, new World”, 142.
13haas, “epistemic communities and International policy”, 3.
14Sabatier, “The advocacy coalition Framework”.
15Kimball, “From Dependency to the Market”; Krastev, "The liberal estate" and “Think tanks”; Sandle, "Think tanks, postcom-
munism and democracy"; Schneider, Think-tanks in Visegrad Countries; Smilov, "Think Tanks at a crossroad”; Struyk, 
Reconstructive Critics.
16Krastev, “Think tanks”, 18.
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on a concrete foreign policy dossier that has deeply involved both countries under study, 
namely the Eastern Partnership initiative.
As we are focusing on two Central European countries and one policy decision, we 
cannot pretend to provide a definitive picture applicable to the whole region or to every 
policy domain. Nevertheless, we hope to provide generalizable observations based on a 
comparative and case study analysis. The Czech Republic and Poland have been chosen 
because they are, at the same time, close in terms of historical experience and foreign pol-
icy orientation while offering variations in terms of size of the country and the think tank 
scene. According to the latest issue of the annual Global Go-To Think Tanks report, there 
are 27 think tanks in the Czech Republic as compared to 42 in Poland .17 In investigating 
the involvement of these think thanks in foreign policymaking, the study relies on official 
documents, secondary sources and, especially, interviews with policymakers and think 
tankers as empirical data.
Czech Republic
Foreign policymaking context
Whether with regard to the country’s institutional architecture, domestic political environ-
ment or foreign policy elites, the Czech context has provided a rather fertile ground for the 
development and activity of think tanks.
First, the country’s decision-making system in foreign policy is centralised and of limited 
scale: this offers few opportunities for outside actors to ‘break in’ to the process but also 
means that the number of key individuals is small, and thus that access to them can confer 
influence. The Czech Republic is a parliamentary system with proportional representation: 
the two centres of the ‘foreign policy executive’ are the Office of the Prime Minister and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).18 In practice, however, the former tends to devote 
little attention to foreign policy as it is responsible for all other governmental policy and 
as this domain plays a relatively minor role in electoral politics. Thus, the design and for-
mulation of foreign policy is mainly left up to the latter which, as will be shown, is rather 
open towards think tanks.
Second, after realisation of the overarching goal of joining NATO and the EU, politicians 
and political parties largely evacuated the foreign policy process, thereby creating a vacuum 
for think tanks to fill in feeding and animating policy debates.19 For instance, ANO 2011 
(originally an acronym for Akce nespokojených občanů [Action for dissatisfied citizens] but 
which also simply means yes in Czech - ano), the second biggest party in the current ruling 
coalition, did not have any sections on foreign policy in its program for the 2013 legislative 
elections. Overall, political parties have occasionally picked up on some international issues 
to score points with the domestic audience, but have rarely formulated consistent foreign 
policy platforms. This is partly explained by the fact that, as in many democracies, Czech 
voters tend not to cast their ballot based on foreign policy questions.
More specifically with respect to the Czech Republic though, this disinterest of political 
parties has to do with the historical context in which the bases of Czech foreign policy were 
17McGann, Global Think Tank Index, 32.
18on the notion of foreign policy executive, see hill, Changing politics of foreign policy, 56.
19Interview with the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign affairs, prague, May 2013.
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set. After the demise of the communist regime in 1989, some concrete issues (for example, 
withdrawal of Soviet troops, exit from the Warsaw Pact, etc) demanded immediate and effective 
attention, while the establishment of a full-fledged party system took time. In the early 1990s, 
foreign policy was thus largely the domaine reservé of President Havel and his advisors: he was 
indeed trusted by Czech political elites to be in the best position, thanks to the international 
aura he had acquired in opposing the communist regime, to represent and defend the country’s 
interests. Havel never joined or created any political party. In the words of one of his advisors, 
at that time “foreign policy existed independently of Parliament or even of domestic politics”.20
Third and most importantly, the structure and composition of the foreign policy elite in 
the Czech Republic somehow predisposes it to collaborate with think tanks. The aforemen-
tioned group around Havel, mostly former dissidents like him, not only laid the foundations 
of Czech foreign policy in the early 1990s, but remained influential for years after that: their 
vision and legacy came to be institutionalised in Czech foreign policy structures and in the 
MFA in particular.21 Coming from the ranks of civil society and having, themselves, often 
worked with American philanthropic foundations and think tanks in the 1980s (such as 
the German Marshall Fund or the National Endowment for Democracy),22 this group had 
a natural tendency to work with think tanks and even integrate people coming from these 
organisations, since they had not themselves followed the traditional civil servant path 
to entering diplomacy. The group that succeeded the dissidents in dominating the Czech 
foreign policy elite in the 2000s, the Atlanticists, who embrace the American model and 
advocate close political and intellectual links with the United States, also have a positive 
inclination towards think tanks.23 Beyond the sociological profiles and ideological orienta-
tions of members of the foreign policy elite, the cohesiveness of this elite matters: dominant 
groups and advocacy coalitions within the elite tend to engage with think thanks so as to 
maintain and reproduce their policy discourses.
Mapping the Czech think tank scene
The main foreign policy think tanks in the Czech Republic can be classified according 
to the typologies set out earlier, although several overlap into more than one category. 
Among research centres (or academic think tanks), Ústav mezinárodních vztahů (Institute 
of International Relations, IIR) is undeniably the most prominent and most influential. It 
has a strong academic orientation in both its staffing and productions and acts as a reserve 
of expertise for the media and the MFA on a broad range of international issues. It is linked 
to the Ministry in terms of funding and statutes, but its academic emphasis allows it to 
retain some latitude and independence. Although its academic foundations and credentials 
are not as strong, Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky (AMO, Association for International 
Affairs) could also somehow be placed in this category as it produces analyses of various 
international issues as well as reviews of the performance of Czech foreign policy. It also 
has a strong emphasis on education, running programmes for high school and university 
students in the Czech Republic and abroad.24
20Interview with a former advisor to Václav havel (later Deputy Foreign Minister, Minister of Defence and chancellor to the 
president), prague, July 2009.
21Fawn, “Symbolism in Diplomacy of havel”.
22cadier and Mikulova, “european endowment for Democracy”.
23cadier, L'invention d'une tradition de politique étrangère [Invention of Foreign policy Tradition].
24These activities and geographical focus have meant that it has sometimes acted as a ‘contract’ and ‘advocacy’ tank.
122   D. CADIER AND M. SUS
The Institute for European Policy (EUROPEUM) and the Prague Security Studies 
Institute (PSSI) are probably the most notable representatives of contract think tanks in 
the country. They tend to focus more specifically on areas that are of priority relevance to 
Czech foreign policy (such as EU affairs, the Eastern Neighbourhood or energy security) 
and to provide technical expertise rather than academic analysis, notably on projects directly 
commissioned by governmental agencies.25 EUROPEUM has cultivated, both in its outputs 
and contacts, a distinctive specialisation on European affairs (EU policies and relations 
with other European states), while PSSI deals with issues related to security understood 
in its broad sense (economic, energy, cyber, etc). Both think tanks subscribe to an identi-
fiable foreign policy orientation and overarching project – promoting EU integration for 
EUROPEUM and strengthening the transatlantic link for PSSI – but without this agenda 
necessarily dictating and limiting their activities.
By contrast, advocacy think tanks such as Evropské hodnoty (European Values) or Centrum 
transatlantických vztahů (Prague Centre for Transatlantic Relations, PCTR) tend to be driven 
by their agenda and to approach policy issues with a more ideological bent. European Values 
was founded with the objective of advancing the idea of further European integration, but 
has also recently been active in denouncing Russia’s presence in the Czech Republic.26 The 
PCTR, a unit within the CEVRO Institute, itself a private university linked to the liberal- 
conservative party Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), is pushing 
the Atlanticist agenda. Finally, although it is not a think tank, but an NGO, Člověk v tísni 
(People in Need, PIN) could also be mentioned in light of its activism on international 
issues (development and democratisation) and its clout in the Czech Republic and in the 
entire Central European region.
Think tank involvement in foreign policymaking
The movement of personnel between the foreign policy executive and think tanks – the 
so-called ‘revolving door’ phenomenon – is remarkably high in the Czech Republic in 
comparison to Poland but also to other European counties such as Germany or France. 
Over the last years, several individuals from the aforementioned institutes have come to 
occupy policymaking positions in the MFA. The most potent example in that sense relates 
to the position of First Deputy Foreign Minister, successively occupied by former directors 
of PIN (2006-10), PSSI (2010-14) and IIR (2014-15), until the position was eventually sup-
pressed. It was a key position within the Ministry’s architecture, as the First Deputy was 
in charge of chairing the weekly collegium meetings, and the aforementioned individuals 
have, indeed, all been described by insiders as being particularly influential when they were 
in office.27 Additional examples could also be cited for almost all of the institutes presented 
above: some members of AMO leadership transited to the position of Chief of Staff of the 
Minister for European Affairs and Deputy Foreign Minister, while the former director of 
EUROPEUM is currently heading the policy planning unit at the MFA. This involvement of 
25This type of production tends to place eUropeUM in the ‘contract think tank’ category, but it could also have been regarded 
as a research centre at certain junctures, notably in light of its links with the european Department of charles University.
26Interestingly, a controversy has recently broken out regarding the publications of this think tank, which a group of czech 
scholars and analysts from other institutes have criticised for their lack of methodological rigour and for disguising ideology 
into expertise. See “Maskovaná ideologie: Mluvme o bevpečnosti, ale bez ideologie” [“Masked Ideology: let’s talk about 
security, but without ideology"], Lidové noviny, 4 november 2016.
27conversations with czech analysts and diplomats, prague, 2009.
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former think tankers testifies to – and in turn is likely to facilitate – think tank involvement 
in the development of policies.
Beyond the example of personnel mobility, tracing think tanks’ involvement in more con-
crete terms implies delving into specific policy dossiers. The case of the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP), an EU initiative towards the post-Soviet space that Prague (and, even more so, 
Warsaw) contributed to initiating and promoting, is particularly enlightening in this 
regard.28 To some extent, with regard to the EaP and the Czech Republic’s policies towards 
the East more generally, think tanks have performed all three functions – kick-starter, agent 
and even joint manager.
First, from the mid-2000s onwards, they contributed to giving greater prominence to the 
Eastern neighbourhood on the Czech foreign policy agenda.29 Institutes like AMO, PIN or 
EUROPEUM organised a plethora of conferences and workshops on the region, thereby pro-
viding a platform that was seized upon by norm entrepreneurs who, from within the foreign 
policy elite, were vying to push for more activism towards the East.30 Second and subsequently, 
once the EaP had been elevated to the rank of foreign policy priority by the Czech diplomacy, 
the MFA turned to think tanks to solicit their expertise on the region and seek their advice on 
how to promote the policy at the EU level. For instance, the non-paper produced by the MFA on 
the Eastern Dimension of the ENP was submitted to IIR experts for comments while, later on, 
EUROPEUM dispensed training to Czech diplomats in anticipation of the Czech Presidency. 
Similarly, PSSI conducted a project commissioned by the MFA that aimed at formulating rec-
ommendations on how to maintain Central European countries’ expertise on the East and, 
relatedly, develop their agenda-setting capacity inside the EU.31 Third, although to a lesser extent, 
think tanks have sometimes cooperated with government agencies in the implementation of the 
Czech Republic’s democratisation assistance and capacity-building policies towards the Eastern 
neighbourhood. For instance, EUROPEUM and AMO have run MFA-funded education and 
civil society building programs in Ukraine and Belarus.
Thus, by carrying out some of the traditional functions associated with think tanks (such 
as advising on policy concerns and evaluating government programs, facilitating network-
ing and the exchange of ideas, and supplying and training personnel), Czech think tanks 
contributed to the development and promotion of a new policy, the EaP. It should be noted, 
however, that by its very nature this issue area provides a favourable terrain for think tanks. 
On the one hand, for the complexities it represents and the opportunities it can offer, the 
EU context tends to invite technical expertise and policy innovation. On the other hand, 
development of policies towards the Eastern neighbourhood demanded the kind of regional 
expertise that is the trademark of think tanks. In that sense, the case of the EaP is illustrative 
but not necessarily representative. In fact, for the other major foreign policy dossier of the 
late 2000s, namely the Czech Republic’s participation in the US Ballistic Missile Defense 
system (BMD), related to national security and bilateral relations with Washington, think 
tanks were much less involved. Rather than mobilising think tanks as hubs of the Czech 
epistemic community to develop and reproduce the coordinative discourse underpinning 
this foreign policy choice, the government created a special representative and a dedicated 
commission, which largely transposed US rhetoric on the BMD into the Czech context.32 
28on czech republic’s involvement in the eap, see Tulmets, “preparing the eU presidency”.
29It was largely absent until then; see Weiss, “projecting the re-Discovered”.
30Kratochvil and Tulmets, "la politique orientale de république Tchèque", 81.
31pSSI, Strengthening Central European Contribution.
32hynek and Stritecky, “rise and Fall of Third Site”, 103.
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Even the main opposition party, seeking to capitalise on public resentment against the BMD 
project, did not reach out to think tanks as a platform for policy debates but chose, instead, 
to create a new organisation for this task.33
Overall, the Czech case demonstrates that think tanks’ involvement and potential influ-
ence is above all mediated by the foreign policy elite and by its sociological composition 
and ideological orientations. Think tanks’ multiple contributions and deep involvement 
in the EaP were largely a function of the alignment of the kind of expertise they were able 
to offer with the agenda of a group of norm entrepreneurs acting from within the foreign 
policy elite. While these think tanks have continued to retain their focus and specialisation 
on the Eastern neighbourhood, they were unable to keep the region on the Czech foreign 
policy radar screen to the same extent once diplomats’ interest in it started to fade.
Poland 
Conditions for the development of foreign policy think tanks 
Examination of the institutional architecture and functioning of foreign policy 
decision-making in Poland, as well as of the practices among political elites paints a picture 
of an environment that is not conducive to the activities of think tanks.
One of the favourable preconditions for foreign policy think tanks in Poland has been 
the ambition of all governments since 1989 for the country to become a regional leader in 
Central Europe. The desire to conduct an active foreign policy by covering various regions 
and topics provides a window of opportunity for think tanks in various stages of the 
decision-making process. At the same time, due to the centralisation of the decision- 
making process, which makes the Council of Ministers (primarily the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, MFA) responsible for conducting foreign policy and representing Polish positions 
together with the President of the Republic, the target group for think tank activities is 
small and approachable. Moreover, the legal regulations of the Polish constitution, the Law 
on Associations and the Foundations Act with subsequent amendments offer convenient 
conditions for the functioning of non-governmental organisations and many Polish think 
tanks enjoy this kind of legal status.34
The urgent necessity to define new priorities and strategies after the breakthrough of 1989 
when an independent Polish foreign policy started, resulted in the creation of numerous 
research centres, but the demand has dropped off over the years.35 Even when presidents 
have had different views on foreign policy issues than the government,36 the demand for 
think tanks’ activities did not increase. Experts from leading think tanks report a scarce 
call for expertise from state institutions and explain it by indicating the growing number 
and importance of in-house experts in the MFA.37 The MFA, although financing two think 
tanks – Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych (Polish Institute for International Affairs, 
PISM) and Instytut Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej (IESW, Institute for Eastern and Central 
Europe) – rarely seeks their advice and prefers to focus on in-house expertise provided by its 
33“10 arguments against the US radar”, Ne Základnám, http://www.nezakladnam.cz/en/437_10-arguments-against-the-us-radar
34on details of legal regulations for the non-governmental sector, see Sus, “Doradztwo w polityce zagranicznej”, [advisory 
in Foreign policy], 93-5.
35on forerunners of polish think tanks, see Sus, “Still lagging behind?”, 155-8.
36For example between 2007 and 2010, when the ruling party and the prime Minister, Donald Tusk, had very opposite views 
on foreign policy issues from those of lech Kaczynski, the president of the republic.
37Interview with an oSW staff member, 10 november 2015; Interview with a pISM staff member, 4 January. 2016.
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own officials. The MFA officials prefer to be advised by in-house sources whom they know 
and trust rather than to reach out for independent think tanks experts who cannot be relied 
on, since they are unfamiliar. A partial explanation for this tendency is the shallowness of the 
modernisation process in Poland and the low level of social capital, which manifests itself 
in widespread distrust towards institutions and elites and a relatively high level of trust in 
the family and persons with whom one has close face-to-face relations.38 Furthermore, most 
member of the foreign policy elite in Poland have followed the traditional civil servant path 
or, as has been the case with most foreign ministers after 1989, were academic professors 
without any experience in working with think tanks. Only Radoslaw Sikorski, who served 
as foreign minister between 2007 and 2014, had the tendency to approach think tanks as 
he had worked for the American Enterprise Institute from 2002 to 2005. During his term, 
he regularly referred in his speeches and strategic documents to think tanks as important 
actors in foreign policymaking.39 This did not, however, have much impact on the generally 
poor knowledge of think tanks among Polish foreign policy elites and the weak traditions 
of cooperating with them.
Moreover, the divisions over foreign policy priorities among Polish political elites are 
deeply rooted and have to be considered from a long-term perspective. The constant fear 
of domination by one of its big neighbours has made diplomatic choices highly politicised. 
While there have been various conflicting narratives, there is one that currently seems to 
dominate – should Poland be the part of the West and ally of Germany or should it become 
a leader of Central Europe, be much more assertive towards the West and regain full con-
trol of its political decisions rather than delegating them to Brussels. After EU accession, 
the politicisation of the foreign policy debate became particularly acute and the standoff 
between the two main parties on these issues have been numerous, as illustrated recently 
by the campaign for the parliamentary elections of November 2015.40 In theory, the polar-
isation could have created a window of opportunity for think tanks to feed ideas into the 
debate. However, rather than as programmatic proposals, foreign policy issues are used 
as instruments in inter-partisan rivalries, limiting the demand for knowledge-based and 
technical advice in foreign policy.
Finally, Polish think tanks struggle with financing their activities. The problem has 
become particularly painful with the economic crisis as foreign private foundations and 
the EU itself are important sources of funding for Polish think tanks.41 Only state-funded 
institutes enjoy a stable budget, all others have to look for short-term project funding and 
very occasionally private sponsors.
Polish foreign policy think tanks42 
The majority of Polish think tanks can be classified as research centres. One of the prime 
examples is the aforementioned Institute for Eastern and Central Europe that operates from 
38Kochanowicz, “Trust, confidence and Social capital”; Bartkowski, “Social capital in poland”.
39Ministry of Foreign affairs, Expose Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Radoslawa Sikorskiego [Speech by Radoslaw Sikorski]; 
Ministry of Foreign affairs, Polish Foreign Priorities 2012-2016.
40Balcer and Blusz, Changing course?
41Institute for public affairs, Sprawozdanie z działalności merytorycznej ISP 2015 [Activity Report of IPA 2015], 40-60.
42For a more detailed background on polish think tanks, see czaputowicz and Stasiak, “political expertise in poland”; Sus, 
“Still lagging behind?”; Sus, “Doradztwo w polityce zagranicznej” [“advisory in Foreign policy”]; Zbieranek, Polski model 
organizacji typu think tank [Polish model of think tank-type organisations].
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Lublin. Its research has a clear academic character, which is amplified by the close cooper-
ation with local universities. Another think tank with an academic orientation is Osrodek 
Studiow Wschodnich (OSW, Centre for Eastern Studies), which monitors and analyses the 
socio-political and economic processes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and 
Turkey. OSW experts publish hundreds of analyses and studies annually and try to engage 
in dialogue with the state administration regarding political developments in the countries 
they focus on.
The biggest and most well known Polish think tank, PISM, poses a challenge to the typol-
ogy applied in this article. On one hand, the Institute publishes a range of academic journals 
and books and focuses much attention on the development of the academic careers of its 
employees, many of whom have PhDs. It also enjoys broad freedom in terms of setting its 
research agenda, which has however to be agreed with the MFA.43 Only occasionally does 
the Institute receive requests from the Ministry to examine a certain issue. Between 2010 
and 2015, the management of PISM changed and the new director tried to transform it into 
something of a ‘contract tank’ by promoting shorter analyses with specific policy recom-
mendations, and reaching out to private companies, which could commission expertise on 
a particular topic that was not on the annual research agenda. A case in point is the study 
on the nuclear energy sector in Poland contracted by a French company, Areva.44 However, 
mid-2016, the management changed again, and PISM seems to be moving back towards a 
purely academic type institution.
The two most important examples in the category of ‘contract think tanks’ are Instytut 
Spraw Publiczynch (ISP, Institute for Public Affairs) and Instytut Studiow Strategicznych 
(Institute for Strategic Studies, ISS). Both institutions focus on specific topics – ISP covers 
European integration and Polish foreign policy towards Eastern Europe, whereas ISS deals 
with the transatlantic community and the role of NATO. Their research outcomes are deliv-
ered in different forms, from written analyses through concrete policy recommendations 
to public debates and workshops.
The last category – ‘advocacy think tanks’ – is represented by a number of think tanks, many 
of which have been established in the last decade. WiseEurope (former demos-EUROPA) 
is a recent example. It promotes stronger European integration and a low-carbon transition 
of the Polish economy. Another think tank of this kind is Insytut Sobieskiego (IS, Sobieski 
Institute), which was established by proponents of the conservative Law and Justice party. The 
ideology of the IS is in line with the foreign policy of the current government and promotes 
a restructuring of the EU by giving decision-making power back to the nation states.
Think tanks’ contribution to foreign policymaking
The most visible trace of think tanks’ involvement in foreign policymaking in Poland can 
be seen in the originally American phenomenon of ‘revolving doors’ between academia, 
the civil service and think tanks.45 This remains very limited in Poland, mainly due to 
the professionalisation of the civil service, which does not make movement between the 
administration and research centres very rewarding. Nevertheless, there have been a few 
43as of September 2016, the government was represented in the twelve-person council via five officials from the Ministry of 
Foreign affairs. also, two members represented the chancellery of the president of the republic of poland.
44conversations with pISM staff members, Warsaw and Wroclaw, 2015.
45haas, “Think Tank and U.S. Foreign policy”, 7-8.
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recent examples of revolving doors: in 2014, an expert on Russia who served as the director 
of the OSW moved to the MFA to become ambassador in Moscow.46 Interestingly, after she 
came back to Poland in 2016, she returned to the think tank sector and became one of the 
directors of Fundacja Stefana Batorego (the Stefan Batory Foundation).
In order to trace other manifestations of think tanks’ involvement, a specific dossier has to 
be taken under consideration. Since the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) has constituted one of Poland’s central foreign policy priorities over the last 
two decades,47 it serves as an illuminating case study, as for the Czech Republic.
Several years before the EU launched the Wider Europe programme in 2004, Polish polit-
ical elites had been developing ideas for further integration of their Eastern neighbours with 
the West. They emphasized that “Poland’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, (…) will enhance the EU policy towards its Eastern neighbours, contributing to the 
development of open and partner-like relations with countries remaining outside the enlarged 
Union”.48 Think tanks such as PISM, OSW and the Stefan Batory Foundation in particular, 
together with other NGOs were actively engaged in delivering ideas on how to close ties 
between the Union and its Eastern neighbours. Their engagement and the dialogue with 
policymakers were a novelty in the decision-making process in Poland and this was facilitated 
by the receptivity of the decision-makers to external advice, on the one hand, and the out-
standing expertise of several think tanks with regard to the Eastern countries, on the other.49
Polish think tanks carried out four main functions. First, they served as kick-starters 
by delivering new ideas on how to integrate Eastern neighbours into the European frame-
work along various lines of cooperation.50 In this regard, they cooperated closely with 
officials who integrated think tank ideas into the first MFA non-paper presented in 2003 
containing Polish proposals for the policy towards the new Eastern neighbours after EU 
enlargement.51 Second, think tanks functioned as agents by monitoring the discussion on 
the ENP within European institutions and the member states.52 As a result of the cooper-
ation between research centres and Polish diplomacy, the latter could effectively react and 
present its proposals in the best possible way. Third, one of the key roles of think tanks was 
to promote Polish ideas for cooperation with Eastern neighbours among European partners 
by organising conferences and expert meetings for discussion of different perspectives on 
integration of this region.53 Here they served as joint-managers with the official diplomacy. 
Finally, Polish think tanks functioned as transmitters between their counterparts from the 
East and the West. The Stefan Batory Foundation organised frequent seminars in which 
experts from Ukraine and Belarus had the opportunity to present their ideas to Western 
colleagues and discuss the possibilities for cooperation.54 Polish foreign ministers actively 
took part in these events and played the role of go-between for the think tank debates and 
high-level political discussions. After the EU officially launched the Eastern Partnership 
in accordance with the Polish-Swedish proposal,55 the willingness of the political elites to 
46For more examples, see Sus, “Still lagging behind?”.
47For more on the polish doctrine towards the east, see Kowal, “Key components of polish position”, 341-4.
48Klatt, “poland and its eastern neighbours”, 6.
49Kowal, “Key components of polish position”, 345.
50pelczynska-nalecz et al., Eastern Policy of the EU.
51Stefan Batory Foundation, “eU enlargement and neighbourhood policy”, 85-8.
52Sadowski, Partnerstwo w czasach kryzysu.[partnership in times of crisis].
53Stefan Batory Foundation, “eU enlargement and neighbourhood policy”, 22-43.
54Stefan Batory Foundation, “Więcej niz sasiedztwo” [More than neighbourhood].
55Ministry of Foreign affairs, Polish-Swedish Proposal.
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cooperate with think tanks decreased significantly. Therefore, after 2009, think tanks began 
to focus on the monitoring of the EaP’s implementation and developing ideas on how to 
improve the framework for cooperation.56
Conclusion 
The functions performed by think tanks in the foreign policy process have been analysed 
with reference to a specific policy dossier, the Eastern Partnership initiative. In both coun-
tries, the Czech Republic and Poland, think tanks contributed to the development, promo-
tion and implementation of this policy. This case study also revealed, however, that these 
contributions were largely a function of the nature of the issue at stake and were mediated 
by the priorities of foreign policy elites. As an initiative requiring region-specific expertise 
and a certain degree of technicality and innovation to be developed in the EU context, the 
EaP was perfectly suited to think tank involvement. By contrast, matters of national security 
are not. Nevertheless, think tanks were active and involved, but within a window defined 
by policymakers; they could not maintain the same level of influence once the priorities of 
the latter had changed.
The comparative analysis of the Czech and Polish cases has revealed interesting con-
trasts, from which several generalisable considerations on the development, functions and 
influence of foreign policy think tanks can be drawn. Polish think tanks traditionally fare 
better in global rankings than their Czech counterparts.57 Yet, as this study has shown, 
Czech think tanks appear to be more involved in national foreign policymaking and, as a 
result, more influential in their respective domestic contexts than Polish think tanks. The 
‘revolving door’ dynamic is, for instance, much more developed in Prague than in Warsaw.
This article advanced two explanations to account for this. The first pertains to the soci-
ology of foreign policy elites. In the Czech Republic, the group that laid the foundations of 
the country’s foreign policy themselves came from civil society. Their vision has largely been 
institutionalised in the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has remained 
open to cooperation with think tanks and the integration of individuals from these institu-
tions. In Poland, by contrast, diplomats have tended to follow a more traditional and more 
hermetic civil servant path. This, together with a low level of trust in independent experts, 
institutions and civil society actors, has often led them to prioritise trustworthy in-house 
expertise rather than reaching out to external actors. The second explanation relates to the 
degree of involvement of political parties in the foreign policy process. It has been minimal 
in the Czech Republic, thus opening a space for think tanks to fill. Conversely, in Poland, 
the degree of politicisation of foreign policy is such that inter-partisan rivalries have dom-
inated and actually structured debates toward controversy and emotional arguments and 
away from technical expertise.
In summary, this article highlights the importance of two elements of the foreign policy 
context — namely the sociological profile of the foreign policy elite and the involvement 
of political parties — in mediating the role and the influence of think tanks on the policy 
56Wojna and Gniazdowski, Eastern Partnership; Kaca et al., Report PISM Learning from Past; pap, “eksperci o sytuacji na 
Ukrainie” [experts on the situation in Ukraine].
57In the Global Think Tank Index, polish think tanks are indeed ranked better both regionally (in the ‘Best Think Tanks in 
central and eastern europe’ category, polish think tanks occupy the 1st and 3rd position, while the first czech think tank 
comes in in 6th place) and internationally (in the ‘Best Foreign policy and International affairs Think Tanks’ category, the 
first polish think tank ranks 19th while the first czech one occupies the 50th position).
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process. Thereby, it invites further research and analysis of these elements, in different 
national contexts and with regard to other policy cases.
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